NextFin news, Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has shed light on the critical decision-making process that led to NATO’s refusal to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in early 2022. According to Stoltenberg’s recently published memoirs On My Watch, and reported on November 9, 2025, by Ukrainian Pravda and other authoritative sources, this decision was deeply influenced by the imperative to avert an expanded war between NATO and Russia.
In a tense conversation remembered as a "painful moment," Stoltenberg recounted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called him from a bunker in Kyiv in February 2022, as Russian tanks approached the city. Zelenskyy made an urgent plea: while he accepted NATO's refusal to send ground troops, he begged for the airspace to be closed to prevent Russian aircraft, drones, and helicopters from conducting air assaults.
Stoltenberg acknowledged that NATO had previously enforced no-fly zones over Bosnia and Herzegovina and northern Iraq to protect civilians, highlighting that the concept was familiar and had precedent. However, he decisively rejected the request for Ukraine. The core reason was the existence of Russia's extensive air defense systems in neighboring Belarus and Russian territory, which posed a critical threat to any NATO aircraft operating over Ukraine.
For NATO to enforce such a zone effectively, it would have needed to first neutralize Russian anti-aircraft defenses in these regions, actions which would have inevitably provoked direct military conflict with Russia. Stoltenberg emphasized that intercepting or shooting down Russian aircraft would have triggered a full-scale war between NATO and Russia. He referenced then-US President Joe Biden's stance that Western leaders were not prepared to risk World War III over Ukraine, reflecting a broad consensus in the West on limiting escalation risks.
This recount also conveyed Stoltenberg’s personal anguish at informing Zelenskyy of the refusal, fearing it might be the last contact given the precarious security situation. While accepting the necessity of avoiding direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, Stoltenberg reflected critically on the delayed and insufficient military aid to Ukraine, speculating that stronger early support might have deterred Russia from launching a full-scale invasion.
The strategic calculus demonstrated by NATO's leadership in 2022 highlights a complex trade-off: the alliance had to weigh the immediate benefits of airspace control protecting Ukraine from Russian air attacks against the catastrophic risk of escalating the conflict into a global war between nuclear-armed powers. This decision underscores the limitations of Western military intervention under the prevailing geopolitical equilibrium and the prioritization of risk mitigation in alliance policy-making.
The implications of Stoltenberg’s revelations are profound. They shed light on NATO’s operational thresholds and risk tolerance when facing a nuclear-capable adversary. The rejection of a no-fly zone inherently shaped the trajectory of the Ukraine conflict, influencing Ukrainian defensive capabilities and the conflict’s overall human and material toll.
Looking forward, the lessons from this episode remain highly relevant. NATO and its partners must continue to innovate in providing effective assistance to Ukraine that bolsters defense while avoiding direct confrontation with Russia. Enhanced intelligence sharing, advanced air defense systems, and increasing Ukraine’s indigenous air defense capabilities are likely focal points.
Further, this episode underscores the enduring strategic challenge of deterrence and escalation control in modern conflicts involving great powers. As NATO navigates evolving security complexities in Eastern Europe and beyond, the alliance’s decision-making frameworks will need to balance assertive defense support with prudent risk management to prevent inadvertent escalation.
According to Ukrainian Pravda, Stoltenberg also reflected on the concurrent diplomatic challenges NATO faced, including the contentious negotiations on Finland and Sweden’s accession, and political tensions within the alliance during Donald Trump’s US presidency. These factors further contextualize the complicated environment in which NATO’s 2022 decisions were made.
In sum, Stoltenberg’s account offers critical transparency and insight into a pivotal strategic choice that has shaped the ongoing Ukraine conflict and NATO-Russia relations. It also highlights the profound dilemmas faced by international security organizations when confronted with aggressive actions by nuclear-armed states in their periphery.
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